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PULL UP A SEAT: BRAZIL SHOULD BE
THE NEXT PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
David A. Bailey*
I. INTRODUCTIONSINCE 1946, the United Nations Security Council has expanded only
once-by adding four nonpermanent seats-in 1963.1 But begin-
ning in 1993, with the creation of the Open-Ended Working Group
on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the
Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the
Security Council, the debate over Security Council reform-especially
expansion-has been an active issue at the U.N. 2 The general consensus
is that it must grow to accommodate the larger body of the U.N., a signifi-
cant majority of which is continuing to press for further debate and action
on reform.3 The vast degree of interest is not surprising: the number of
member-states in the General Assembly has nearly quadrupled since its
inception.4 The current debate is not over the question of expansion, but
rather over three aspects of the presumed eventual growth: (1) the num-
ber of members, (2) their type of membership (i.e., permanent or term),
and (3) whether the veto power should be extended to new permanent
members, if any are added.5 This article primarily addresses the second
consideration with respect to Brazil's membership on the Council. Spe-
cifically, if the Security Council is reformed, and if it includes new perma-
nent seats, whether Brazil should join the Council as a permanent
member.
Brazil is a significant player in twenty-first century international polit-
ics, and the Latin American power is demonstrating exceptional ability in
managing two of the most important challenges the planet faces today:
*Candidate for Juris Doctor, May 2011, Southern Methodist University, Dedman
School of Law.
1. G.A. Res. 1991 A (XVIII), 1 1, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (Dec. 17, 1963).
2. See G.A. Res. 48/26, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/26 (Dec. 3, 1993).
3. See Letter from Zahir Tanin, Perm. Rep. of the Islamic Republic of Afg. to the
U.N. & Chairman of the Intergov't Negotiations on the U.N. Sec. Council Reform,
to all Member-States (July 16, 2009) (on file with author).
4. See Growth in United Nations Membership: 1945-Present, United Nations, http://
www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
5. See Competing Plans Threaten UN Reform, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Nov. 2, 2005,
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/O,,1646347,00.html.
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economic stability and climate change.6 In addition, Brazil is particularly
well situated to participate meaningfully in Middle-Eastern relations with
the European/American "West" because it maintains key diplomatic ties
with prominent actors on both sides of that division.7
Regionally, Brazil is a heavyweight. It is the sixth most populous coun-
try in the world with a strong economy and modern defenses.8 As the
largest country in South America, with significant influence across both
South and Latin America, Brazil is a counterweight to the United States'
power and influence in the southern half of the Western Hemisphere.
Part One of this article provides background and the leading argu-
ments in the Security Council reform debate, acknowledging that the in-
evitable consequence seems to be expansion. Two of the most pressing
questions are whether a larger Council will include new permanent mem-
bers and, if so, whether the new permanent members will wield veto
power. Part Two argues that Brazil is the ideal choice for a new perma-
nent member on the Council based on its credentials in four critical areas
that should be addressed when vetting a new permanent member of the
Security Council: (1) economic strength, (2) support of U.N. operations,
(3) international leadership, and (4) representational considerations.
PART ONE
II. THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
Perhaps the most solemn duty ever taken up by humankind rests with
the Security Council: it has "primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security."9 Originally, the United Nations Se-
curity Council was comprised of five permanent members-the victors of
World War II: China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom, and the United States-and ten nonpermanent mem-
bers, which were elected by the General Assembly for terms of two
years.10 Membership was highly coveted because of the high degree of
power and influence vested in the Council.
A. THE VETO POWER
The term "veto" is nowhere in the U.N. Charter." Nevertheless, the
6. Shannon O'Neil, Brazil as an Emerging Power: The View from the United States, S.
Afr. Inst. of Int'l Affairs Policy Briefing No. 16 (2010).
7. Sandra Azima, A New Era of Diplomacy? The Role of Brazil in the Middle East,
GLOBALAFFAIRS, Dec. 1, 2009, http://www.globalaffairs.es/en/a-new-era-of-diplo-
macy-the-role-of-brazil-in-the-middle-east/.
8. CIA World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html (last visited Aug. 4,
2010); see also Military Strength of Brazil, http://www.globalfirepower.com/coun-
try-military-strength-detail.asp?country-id=Brazil (last visited Sept. 10, 2010)
(ranking Brazil 8th in the world in terms of military strength).
9. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1.
10. Id. art. 23, para I (membership has since increased to ten); see G.A. Res. 48/26,
supra note 2, $ 1.
11. See generally U.N. Charter.
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most powerful privilege of a permanent member on the Security Council
is not the promise of representation or longevity, it is, undeniably, the
absolute right to ensure that the Council-and in some cases the entire
General Assembly-does not take action that the permanent member-
state does not support.12 The Charter explicitly requires unanimity
among the permanent Council members in two situations: (1) non-proce-
dural Security Council decisions, 13 and (2) ratification of Charter amend-
ments, upon approval by either a supermajority of the General
Assembly' 4 or designated Charter review conference.' 5
These unanimity requirements allow a single country to render the pri-
mary body entrusted with protecting international safety dangerously
idle.16 Perhaps more striking is that any one of these five countries can
stand against the other 190 member-states and prevent a near 100% ma-
jority from amending the Charter that unites them.17 This latter scenario
has never occurred, but is possible under Article 109.18 The former sce-
nario, a silenced Security Council, on the other hand, has been effected
numerous times: between 1946 and 2004, a total of 179 Security Council
decisions were killed by veto.19 Some scholars contend that many more
Council proposals were vetoed than those officially cited by the U.N. 20
Given the magnitude of this right, the power is, unsurprisingly, often criti-
cized; some even argue it should be eliminated. 21
On the other hand, the veto mechanism could be the primary driver
behind any legitimacy the Council enjoys. 2 2 When the five permanent
members agree to take action, they are highly likely to follow through on
the decision, given the diplomatic intricacies of gaining consensus, and
because these five nations are responsible for approximately forty per-
cent of the U.N. budget.23 Conversely, if one of these financing countries
is not interested, the veto provides the power to prevent unfunded man-
12. See U.N. Charter art. 108.
13. Id. art. 27, paras. 1-2.
14. Id. art. 108.
15. Id. art. 109 para. 2.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. paras. 1-3.
19. See Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on
and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related
to the Security Council, Report of the OEWG, 1 13-17, U.N. Doc A/58/47 (Jan. 24,
2005) [hereinafter Report of the OEWG].
20. See SYDNEY D. BAILEY, TIE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SE7CURITY COUNCIL 201
(1988) (recognizing 203 vetoed proposals by December 1986).
21. E.g., Keith L. Sellen, The United Nations Security Council Veto In The New World
Order, 138 MIL. L. REv. 187, 188 (1992).
22. Rudiger Wolfrum, Challenge to International Governance: Theme
III-International Regimes: Progress and Problems: The Security Council: Its Au-
thority and Legitimacy, 87 AM. Soc'Y INT'l L. PROC. 300, 317 (1993). But see
David D. Caron, Strengthening the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 300, 306-07 (1993) (a presenter & co-panelist with Wol-
frum arguing that veto-power significantly undermines legitimacy).
23. See G.A. Res. 64/248, 1 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/248 (Feb. 5, 2010).
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dates or having to finance a cause to which the state is opposed. 24 The
problem, of course, is that this privilege is vested in only the permanent
members.
An important aspect of the veto is that it is only a negative power. A
single country can stall or prevent action, but it does not have the power
to act unilaterally and affirmatively on the rest of the world or require the
General Assembly to carry out its will.25 The veto, however, is the most
significant component of the powers vested in the permanent members of
the Council. This power to handicap the Council is best demonstrated by
the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union during the
second half of the twentieth century. Interestingly, the use of the veto
power did not become controversial until the Council began to operate
effectively after the end of the Cold War, when its use actually
decreased. 26
B. SECURITY COUNCIL AcTIvITy
1. Inception through the Cold War (1946-1991): Insecure Council
Security Council reform is not a novel issue of the twenty-first century.
It wasn't until the fall of the Soviet Union, however, that reform became
a serious discussion. From 1946 through 1991, the Council authorized
force to address international aggression only twice: to remove North Ko-
rea from South Korea in 195027 and to evict Iraq from Kuwait in 1990.28
The primary hindrance to an active Council was the requirement that the
five permanent members unanimously agree to act.2 9 When a permanent
member refuses to agree with the Council, as discussed above, it consti-
tutes a veto.30
A member's abstention on a particular matter, however, does not oper-
ate as a veto.31 During the Korean War, for example, the Security Coun-
cil passed Resolution 84 against North Korea-its first authorization of
international force.32 The measure passed only because the U.S.S.R. had
been boycotting the Council for seven months and was not present to
impede the resolve of the remaining four permanent members. 33 Shortly
thereafter, the Soviet Union reclaimed its place at the table and became
an active blockade once again.34
24. See id.
25. See Report of the OEWG, supra note 19, at 13-17.
26. See, e.g., David M. Malone, The Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era: A
Study in the Creative Interpretation of the U.N. Charter, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'i L. &
Pot. 487, 489 (2003).
27. S.C. Res. 84, $ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1588 (June 27, 1950).
28. S.C. Res. 678, $ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
29. See U.N. Charter art. 108.
30. See id.
31. PETER MALANCZUK & MICHAEL B. AKEHURST, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRO-
DICION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 375-76 (7th ed., 1997).
32. S.C. Res. 84, supra note 27, $ 5.
33. See MALANCZUK, supra note 31, at 375-76.
34. See Report of the OEWG, supra note 19, at 16.
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In fact, the Soviet Union's dominance on the Council with its veto-
based obstructions gravely concerned the General Assembly, motivating
that body to take up the sword of international defense in November
1950 when it passed Resolution 377 (V): Uniting for Peace. 35 This proce-
dure recognized that while the Security Council has "primary responsibil-
ity" for international security, it was not exclusive authority.36 The
Uniting for Peace procedure allowed the larger body to take action when
the Council was deadlocked by Soviet vetoes.37 Some authorities ques-
tion whether this shifting of authority procedure is legal under the Char-
ter.38 It has never been contested or adjudicated, but has received
general approval in an advisory opinion from the International Court of
Justice.39
Even after the Korean War ended in 1953, the Council remained stag-
nant. The U.S.S.R.'s use of the veto significantly diminished after 1965,
but then other permanent members began to exercise their veto powers
more frequently. 40 Most notably, the United States began heavy use of
its veto.41 With the tension between the United States and U.S.S.R., ac-
complishing much on the Council was challenging.
The U.S.S.R. officially dissolved on December 26, 1991, ending the
Cold War and its effective freeze on the Security Council.42 Since the fall
of the Soviet Union, veto use diminished significantly, and the Council
began to function more as it was originally intended.43 This brought new
challenges and new criticism.
2. The Gulf War and Beyond (1991-2010): Council Activism
During 1991 and 1992, no permanent member vetoed any Security
Council decision.44 It was the first time in over a decade that the Council
went a complete year without a veto, and the first time in history without
a veto in two consecutive years. 45 It appeared as though the essentially
dormant Security Council had finally awoken, and the members were
working together to manage threats to international security. 46 Soon, the
public concern over the newly reenergized Council was not vetoes, but
35. G.A. Res. 377 (V), % 1, U.N. Doc. A/377 (Nov. 3, 1950).
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. E.g., BAma-ty, supra note 20, at 209.
39. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 1.C.J. 151, 163
(July 20, 1962).
40. Report of the OEWG, supra note 19, at 13-15.
41. Id.
42. See End of the Soviet Union: Text of Gorbachev's Farewell Address, N.Y. TIMFS,
Dec. 26, 1991, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/26/world/end-
of-the-soviet-union-text-of-gorbachev-s-farewell-address.html.
43. See Report of the OEWG, supra note 19, at 13-14.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. David M. Malone, The Security Council in the 1990's: Inconsistent, Improvisational,
Indispensable?, On the Threshold: The United Nations and Global Governance in
the New Millennium International Conference, Tokyo, Jan. 19-21 2000, http://
www.unu.edulmillennium/malone.pdf.
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rather its resolutions.4 7 The Council promulgated a significant number of
resolutions as it became active. 4 8 As its decisions became more abundant
and affected more states, calls to rein in the Council became more fre-
quent, from both governments and academia. 4 9
The General Assembly created the Open-Ended Working Group on
the Question of Equitable Representation and an Increase of the Mem-
bership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Secur-
ity Council in 1993.50 The Working Group has published annual reports
for the General Assembly since 1994, focusing on the different issues that
permeate Security Council reform, most notably: expansion, categories
of membership, the veto power, and geographical representation. 51 Each
Secretary-General since 1994 has made a priority of reorganizing the Se-
curity Council to reflect a more democratic and representative constitu-
tion of power.52 And while the consensus has shifted toward reform,
including a respectable degree of support for expansion of permanent
membership, no single plan has emerged that is able to satisfy the requi-
site supermajority in the General Assembly and the five permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council. 5 3
III. SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM
There is one nearly insurmountable obstacle to reform: the Security
Council. Because permanent membership in the Council is determined
by the Charter, amending Article 23 is the only way to modify the Coun-
cil. 5 4 But amending the Charter requires unanimous agreement among
the Council's permanent members.55 The United States, United King-
dom, China, Russia, and France, collectively and individually, hold the
keys to the only door that permits reform. 56 Clearly then, it is not sur-
47. See, e.g., Derek Gilman, Comment, The Gulf War & The United Nations Charter:
Did The Security Council Fulfill Its Original Mission?, 24 CONN. L. RiEv. 1131,
1156 (1992).
48. See Justin S. Gruenberg, Note, An Analysis of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions: Are All Countries Treated Equally?, 41 CASE W. Rigs. J. INT'L L. 469,
511 n.176 (2009) (noting that before 1990, "the Security Council never published
more than twenty-nine resolutions in any year. . .[but] [f]rom 1990 to 2007, the
Security Council averaged more than sixty-three resolutions each year," including
ninety-three in 1993).
49. See, e.g., Burns W. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 & Persian Gulf Deci-
sion Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 523 (1991) (arguing
the Security Council's Resolution 678 gave too much authorization to U.S. military
forces with too little oversight).
50. G.A. Res. 48/26, supra note 2, 1.
51. See OEWG, Report of the OEWG on the Question of Equitable Representation on
& Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to
the Security Council, 5, U.N. Doc. A/63/47 (Sept. 14, 2009) [hereinafter OEWG
Report on Equitable Representation]; G.A. Res. 48/26, supra note 2, $9 2-3.
52. The Secretary-General, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, 2,
10 1 6, U.N. Doc. A/51/950 (July 14, 1997).
53. See OEWG Report on Equitable Representation, supra note 51, at 1, 1 3-5.
54. U.N. Charter art. 23.
55. U.N. Charter art. 108.
56. U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1.
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prising that the Council has been changed only once.57 The challenge is
to design a reinvented Security Council that satisfies the requirements of
each permanent member, and then work from there to garner support for
the required two-thirds of the General Assembly. Even then, assuming
the permanent members can come to agree on a single design, amassing
the requisite supermajority in the General Assembly poses significant
difficulties.
A. GROWTH IN THE UNITED NATIONS
Since its adoption in 1945, the U.N. Charter has been amended on only
three occasions.58 In each instance, the change was perceived as a neces-
sary one to accommodate growth of the General Assembly. 59 By 1963,
U.N. membership had more than doubled.60 In December of that year,
the General Assembly passed the first amendment to the Charter, which
enlarged the Security Council from eleven to fifteen members and re-
quired a supermajority of nine votes to pass a resolution.6' There were
still only five permanent members, but they were outnumbered two-to-
one with ten nonpermanent members accounting for the remainder of the
Council, which provided a sufficient number of nonpermanent members
to block action desired by a unanimous panel of the permanent mem-
bers. 62 The first amendment also enlarged the Economic and Social
Council, another subsidiary U.N. body, from eighteen members to
twenty-seven. 63 Almost immediately following these changes, to accom-
modate for the larger Security Council and reinstitute internal consis-
tency with Article 27, Article 109 was amended to require the agreement
of nine Council members to call for a General Conference to review the
Charter, a requisite step in the amendment process. 64 Finally, in 1971,
Article 61 was amended again to double the size of the Economic and
Social Council to fifty-four members. 65
Thus, after twenty-five years, the proportionate representation of
members on the Economic and Social Council had grown (from thirty-
five to forty percent of members directly represented), but membership
on the Security Council-arguably the most important international
group in modern history-had diminished to just over eleven percent of
57. G.A. Res. 1991 A, supra note 1, 1.
58. G.A. Res. 1991 A & B (XVIII), A 1 1, B $ 1, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (Dec. 17, 1963);
G.A. Res. 2101 (XX), 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/6180 (Dec. 20, 1965); G.A. Res. 2847
(XXVI), 1 2, U.N. Doc. A/8578/Add.1 (Dec. 20, 1971).
59. G.A. Res. 1991 A & B, supra note 58; G.A. Res. 2101, supra note 58; G.A. Res.
2847, supra note 58.
60. See United Nations, supra note 4.
61. G.A. Res. 1991 A, supra note 1, 1 1.
62. See W. Michael Reisman, Redesigning the United Nations, I SING. J. INT'L &
Comr. L. 1, 14 (1997) (this structure gives rise to what has been coined the "non-
aligned veto").
63. G.A. Res. 1991 B, supra note 58, 1 1, 3.
64. G.A. Res. 2101, supra note 58, 91 1.
65. G.A. Res. 2847, supra note 58, 11 1, 3.
2011] 89
90 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 17
nations in the General Assembly. 66 In 2010, membership is at less than
eight percent, with a mere three percent of nations in the Assembly that
have permanent representation. 67 And because the Council can be modi-
fied only through amending the Charter, this three percent has control
over the mechanisms to change the status quo, thereby ensuring their sev-
eral interests are protected in any eventual reform.68
Fortunately, the Security Council is not so imperialistic. Each perma-
nent member has publicly agreed on the need for reform.69 But that is as
far as the agreement extends. The United States has supported both Ja-
pan and Germany as new permanent members on the Council, with sig-
nificantly more emphasis on Japan's ascension in recent years.70 France
and the United Kingdom have endorsed granting permanent seats to
Germany, Brazil, India, and Japan.71 China has spoken favorably of Bra-
zil and India taking permanent seats, but is not open to Japan joining the
group as a permanent member. 72 Russia has not publicly named any
country it would support, but claims to be open to "any reasonable op-
tion" that does not reduce the effectiveness of the Council.73 So while
the consensus is that the Council should grow, by how many seats and
with which countries remain significant hurdles.
B. COMPETING CONSIDERATIONS FOR REFORM
Setting aside the proclivities of the individual nations and their respec-
tive motivations for entrenching the status quo and assuming real change
is necessary and forthcoming, there are two fundamental concerns that
must be addressed and resolved in a redesigned Security Council. Unfor-
tunately, they are directly opposed to each other. First is the political
problem of legitimacy, or alternatively, representation. If the Security
Council comes to be perceived as an embodiment of a power-hungry mi-
nority, the remainder of the world population will not give the Council's
66. KUMIKO MATSUURA, JOACHIM W. MULLER, & KARL P. SAUVANT, CHRONOLOGY
AND FAcr BOOK OF THE1 UNITED NATIONS 233-34 (1992).
67. See United Nations, supra note 4; Membership in 2010, United Nations Sec. Coun-
cil, http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
68. U.N. Charter art. 23
69. Press Release, Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, Acting U.S. Rep. to the U.N.,
Statement on U.S. Proposals for U.N. Reform, in the Gen. Assembly (June 22,
2005) (on file with author) (United States); Support for UN Reform Increases,
BBC NEws, Sept. 24, 2004, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/368420.stm
(France and the United Kingdom); U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 112d plen. mtg. at 7,
U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.112 (July 12, 2005) (Russia); China, US Agree to Make Efforts
to Block G-4 UN Council Expansion Plan: Envoy, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Aug.
5, 2005, http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/137442.htm (China).
70. See Patterson, supra note 69.
71. E.g., Edith Lederer, China: UN Council Resolution Dangerous, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, June 1, 2005, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/200-re-
form/41203.pdf.
72. See BRIC Joint Statement, Apr. 15, 2010, available at http://www.cfr.org/publica-
tion/21927/bricsummit-joint-statement-april_2010.html; Antoaneta Bezlova,
China Guards its UN Interests, ASIA TIMES, June 16, 2005, available at http://www.
atimes.com/atimes/China/GF16AdOl.html.
73. U.N. GAOR, supra note 69, at 7.
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resolutions and directives due respect, thereby rendering the Council
ineffective.
The first sixty-five years of the U.N. have brought enormous growth. 7 4
A fraction of the membership has a place at the Security Council, and an
even smaller group carries the privileges and power of permanency.75
The push for democracy around the world demands a larger group that
provides wider participation. This issue is even more critical when con-
sidered in terms of population.
Over half of the world's population resides in six countries. 76 Two of
them have permanent seats on the Council: China and the United
States.77 Russia is in the top ten.78 France and the United Kingdom rank
twenty-first and twenty-second, respectively, and those twenty-two coun-
tries together contain nearly three-quarters of the people on Earth.79
Perhaps more surprising, the combined population of the five permanent
members is only twenty-eight percent of the total planet population.80
Thus, only about a quarter of the world population is represented by per-
manent members on the Security Council.
The second fundamental concern is that the Council must be effective
to execute its duties. Effectiveness of a group has a strong relationship
with its size.8 ' Research suggests that small groups of five to nine mem-
bers perform better than larger or smaller groups. 82 But "the addition of
each additional person also contributes to an ever increasing information
sharing and coordination burden. . .[and eventually] adding more people
becomes counterproductive to achieving team goals within a reasonable
amount of time." 83 When the Council has been effective, it has probably
been so because it is a small manageable group. Thus, an increase in
membership-to raise representational legitimacy-may counteract the
Council's effectiveness.
Unfortunately, there is no perfect resolution to ensure that the small
group does what the larger population wants accomplished, even if the
small group believes it is working toward the best interests of the larger
population. It seems as though no degree of transparency can compen-
sate for outright exclusion. With the structure as it is, only the five per-
74. See United Nations, supra note 4.
75. Membership in 2010, U.N. Security Council, http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp
(last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
76. See CIA World Fact Book, supra note 8; World Population Summary: Population
Clocks, U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpopinfo.
php (last visited Sept. 16, 2010).
77. CIA World Fact Book, supra note 8.
78. Id.
79. Id.; World Population Summary: Population Clocks, supra note 76.
80. CIA World Fact Book, supra note 8; World Population Summary: Population
Clocks, supra note 76.
81. Jonathan B. Gil, Enabling Design 47 (May 21, 2009) (unpublished monograph,
available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA507987&Location=
U2&doc=GEtTRDoc.pdf).
82. Id. at 45-56.
83. Id. at 47.
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manent Security Council members are guaranteed a basic expectation of
participation. The trade-off is that the Council is enabled to act quickly
and decisively. To what degree the permanent members will be willing to
sacrifice the Council's effectiveness is likely what will determine any new
Security Council constituency.
C. LEADING PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Myriad proposals for a modern Security Council have emerged since
the effort took root in 1993, and they generally fall into four designs: (1)
increase the number of permanent seats, (2) increase the number of
elected term seats, (3) increase the number of both permanent and term
seats, or (4) create a third type of membership to join the existing
Council.84
Little progress was made through the process of member-states submit-
ting proposal after proposal. Even when countries agreed on a design,
they disagreed on the constituent makeup of the envisioned Council.85
Finally, in 2003, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan established the
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to assess the inter-
national threats of the twenty-first century to evaluate how the U.N. is
addressing threats to security, and to recommend steps to take to en-
hance and strengthen the U.N. and its response to global threats.86 In
December 2004, the Panel submitted its comprehensive report on world
security, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility," which in-
cluded two models for Security Council expansion.87 These steps en-
couraged blocs of states to organize and develop draft resolutions for
modifying the Security Council, as opposed to individual states'
recommendations.88
The following year, four competing proposals seemed to lead the de-
bate: (1) the G-4 plan from Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan;89 (2) the
United for Consensus proposal, from a large group of states including
prominent regional competitors of the G-4 nations, notably Argentina,
Italy, Pakistan, and South Korea;90 (3) the African Union proposal;91 and
84. Jakob Silas Lund, Pros and Cons of Security Council Reform, C-NrER FOR UN
EDucAIoN REFORM, Jan. 19, 2010, http://centerforunreform.org/node/414.
85. Compare Patterson, supra note 69 with Bezlova, supra note 72 (regarding the
United States and China's divergent positions on Japan as a potential permanent
member).
86. See The Secretary General, High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, & Change, A
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, J%1 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec.
2, 2004) [hereinafter High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change].
87. See High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, & Change, A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility, 991 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
88. See generally id.
89. G.A. Res. 59/L.64, U.N. Doc. A/59/L.64 (July 6, 2005).
90. G.A. Res. 59/L.68, U.N. Doc. A/59/L.68 (July 21, 2005).
91. G.A. Res. 60/L.41, U.N. Doc. A/60/L.41 (Dec. 14, 2005).
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(4) Secretary-General's endorsement of the High-level Panel's models. 92
In each case, all of the permanent members would have to sign on, along
with two-thirds of the General Assembly, because each proposal requires
amending the Charter.93
1. The G-4 Proposal
Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, as part of a larger group of nations,
submitted their draft resolution to the General Assembly on July 6,
2005.94 These four nations became the front-runners of the group and are
now collectively known as the "G-4," and have submitted subsequent
draft resolutions as the smaller bloc. 9 5 As recently as February 2010, the
four nations continue to reassert the reform plan outlined in the original
July 2005 proposal.96
The G-4 design adds permanent membership seats on the Council, and
argues that expansion is needed "to better reflect contemporary world
realities."97 In this envisioned Council, they increase the total number of
seats by ten: six permanent and four nonpermanent seats elected for two-
year terms.98 Of the permanent seats, the group calls for two from Afri-
can States, two from Asian states, one from Latin American or Caribbean
states, and one from Western European or other states. 99 The new non-
permanent seats are similarly geographically distributed.100 Interestingly,
this proposal requires a majority of fourteen out of twenty-five members,
which is a slight reduction from the current majority requirement of
three-fifths.o'0 Perhaps the most contentious point in the resolution is the
issue of how many of the ten permanent members would have to concur
to effect a Council decision.
Paragraph 5, entitled "Veto," is one of the shortest in the draft resolu-
tion, but it certainly carries the most radical change.102 The G-4 asserts
"[t]hat the new permanent members should have the same responsibili-
ties and obligations as the current permanent members." 0 3 The chal-
lenge they face is daunting; persuading the current permanent members
to relinquish any of that privilege is nearly a lost cause. The United
92. The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All, $ 170, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/
2005 (Mar. 25, 2005) [hereinafter In Larger Freedom].
93. See U.N. Charter art. 108; U.N. Charter art. 109, para. 2.
94. G.A. Res. 59/L.64, supra note 89, $ 1.
95. Letter from Permanent Representatives of Braz., F.R.G., India, & Japan, to Am-
bassador Zahir Tanin, Chairman, lntergov't Negotiations Group (Feb. 25, 2010)
(on file with author).
96. Id.
97. G.A. Res. 59/L.64, supra note 89, 1 2.
98. Id. 1(a).
99. Id. 11(b).
100. See generally id. 3 $1 1(c).
101. Compare U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1 and art. 27, para. 3, with G.A. Res. 59/L.64,
supra note 89, 9 6(b).
102. G.A. Res. 59/L.64, supra note 89, 5(a).
103. Id.
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States, for example, has explicitly refused to consider any proposal that
extends the veto.' 0 4 Even more striking than the extension of the veto to
new members is the G-4 plan to create a majority of new permanent
members-six to the original five-all having veto power.105 Working
together, these two elements of the proposal almost guarantee failure. In
an attempt to assuage the concern, the draft included an introductory
phase of permanent membership, during which no new permanent mem-
ber could exercise the veto.' 0 6 After fifteen years, the General Assembly
and Security Council would be forced to review extending the veto to the
new permanent members. 07 It appears to be a courtship period for the
old power to warm up to the new.
2. The Uniting for Consensus Proposal
Approximately two weeks after the G-4 submitted and circulated its
draft resolution, a competing group proposed an alternative that has been
well received. 08 A large group of countries, which became known by the
title of one of their joint statements: Uniting for Consensus (UFC),
echoed the G-4's suggestion that the Council be expanded to twenty-five
members. 109 This group, however, did not propose adding any perma-
nent member seats, just ten additional members elected for two-year
terms to render the Council "more democratic, more equitably represen-
tative, more transparent, more effective and more accountable."" 0 The
draft also proposed multiple modifications to the Council's working
methods. The first item harked back to the days of an inactive Security
Council, calling for "[r]estraint on the use of the veto.""' And it urged
the Council to establish formalized procedural rules to increase trans-
parency and democratic participation."12
The proposal was innovative in the way it envisioned the term seats.
The UFC group distributed the twenty elected seats among "geographical
groups" with "six from African States; five from Asian States; four from
Latin American and Caribbean States; three from Western European and
other States; two from Eastern European States," and modifies Article
23(2) to allow immediate reelection "subject to the decision of their re-
spective geographical groups."' 1 3 By dividing the seats specifically to re-
gions and allowing for successive terms, this proposal allows regional
104. Press Release, General Assembly, Convinced that Expanding Size of Security
Council is an Absolute Necessity Member States Discuss Ways to Carry Out 'Deli-
cate Engineering Project,' U.N. Doc. GA/10887 (Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gal0887.doc.htm.
105. See G.A. Res. 59/L.64, supra note 89, 2 91(a), 3-4 5.
106. Id. $ 5(b).
107. See id. 11 5(b), 7.
108. G.A. Res. 59/L.68, supra note 90.
109. Id. 11.
110. Id. 1 2.
111. Id. 1 7(a).
112. Id. 1 7(b).
113. Id. 11 3(1)-(2), 4.
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blocs of countries to have de facto permanent members, albeit without
veto power. 114 Yet, actual election would still be governed by the entire
Assembly: the geographical groups only determine eligibility to run for
reelection, so the larger body would have a mechanism to prevent a par-
ticular nation from becoming a de facto permanent member on the
Council.'1 5
While the UFC proposal may not be a direct response to the G-4 draft
resolution, the small group of prominent UFC leaders is comprised of
regional competitors with the G-4 nations.116 Many Latin and South
American nations aligned with UFC-and thereby against Brazil's efforts
in the G-4-most notably Argentina and Mexico." 7 Italy's UFC involve-
ment appears to be a counterbalance to Germany's G-4 participation." 8
Likewise, Pakistan and South Korea's UFC memberships are almost
surely messages to India and Japan, respectively.' 19
The complete UFC lineup accounts for more than one quarter of the
members of the General Assembly, and is the G-4's most significant com-
petition.120 Because it does not call for new permanent members or ex-
tend the veto beyond its current scope, this design seems to garner more
support among the permanent members of the Council. But the United
States and Russia have both expressed concerns over the Council grow-
ing too large, seeming to agree that twenty should be the limit.121
3. African Union Proposal
In December 2005, the African Union (AU) published its draft resolu-
tion for Security Council reform.122 This proposal increased the Council
to twenty-six members, including seven seats to be held by African mem-
ber-states: two permanent and five nonpermanent. 12 3 Like the G-4 pro-
posal, the AU added permanent seats wielding veto power equal to that
of current permanent members.124 The AU model, however, did not in-
clude any limitation on the veto power for existing or new permanent
members.125
The AU draft resolution is markedly different from the G-4 and UFC
drafts in that there appears to be an aura of centrism that is not present in
the other two proposals. Indeed, the AU incorporates "the undeniable
fact that in 1945, when the United Nations was being formed, most of
Africa was not represented and that, as a result, Africa remains to this
114. Id. 19 3-6.






121. See U.N. GAOR, supra note 69, at 8; Patterson, supra note 69.
122. G.A. Res. 60/L.41, supra note 91.
123. Id. 9 (c).
124. Compare id. 291(b), with G.A. Res. 59/L.64, supra note 89, 3 91 5(a).
125. See U.N. GAOR, supra note 69, at 8.
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day the only continent without a permanent seat in the Council." 126 Four
African nations are founding members of the U.N.1 27 Granted, it is "un-
deniable" that four does not constitute "most," but given that the growth
in membership is nearly four-fold over the last sixty-five years, many ar-
eas were not represented in 1945.128 Moreover, South America does not
have a permanent seat on the Council, nor does Oceania. 129 With that
said, African states certainly need more robust representation on the
Council. Professor A. Peter Mutharika observed that many concerns of
the Security Council are in Africa, and soundly argues that a strong Afri-
can presence on the Council is essential.130
Nevertheless, the AU proposal is a clear lobbying effort for permanent
seats for specific countries, and while it is not unlike the G-4 plan in that
regard, it has not been as widely accepted. The G-4 proposal, in turn,
does not garner as much public favor as the UFC approach, which is the
most inclusive and does not have an obvious group of countries it aims to
benefit.
4. "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility"
The catalyst for these draft resolutions, which have helped frame the
reform debate, was the December 2004 report from the High-level Panel
on Threats, Challenges and Change.131 The Panel proposed two models
for a new Security Council and provided guidance. 132 In March 2005, the
Secretary-General published his report "In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security and Human Rights for All," in which he endorsed
the Panel's guidance and recommendations and called for member-states
to consider and build upon its models. 133 To that end, it seems that the
G-4 is loosely based on Model A, where the UFC position is more in line
with Model B.
Both of the Panel's models added nine seats, enlarging the Council to
twenty-four members, organized by six-seat clusters across four regional
areas: Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe, and the Americas.134 Model A
seems to be a simple expansion of what already exists. It increases the
permanent membership to eleven, with thirteen non-renewable, two-year
term seats (three more than currently exist).135 The six new permanent
126. G.A. Res. 60/L.41, supra note 91, 1 2.
127. See United Nations, supra note 4 (Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Union of
South Africa were the four founding African states).
128. Compare id., with G.A. Res. 60/L.41, supra note 91, $ 2.
129. See generally Members, U.N. Sec. Council, http://www.un.org/sc/list-eng5.asp (last
visited Mar. 10, 2010).
130. A. Peter Mutharika, The Role of the United Nations Security Council in African
Peace Management: Some Proposals, 17 MiCL. J. INr'i L. 537, 539-40 (1996).
131. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, supra note 86,
1 6.
132. Id.
133. In Larger Freedom, supra note 92, 9 170.
134. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, supra note 86,
1 251.
135. Id. 1 252.
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seats, however, do not come with veto power-the veto still rests exclu-
sively with the five original permanent members. The six new permanent
seats, however, do not come with veto power-the veto still rests exclu-
sively with the five original permanent members.136 Model B does not
add any new permanent seats, but increases the number of two-year, non-
renewable seats from ten to eleven, and creates a third category: eight
four-year renewable seats.' 37
Other than structural guidelines, intended to facilitate the debate, the
Panel did not endeavor to suggest which states should comprise the envi-
sioned future Council.138 It did, however, provide guidance on criteria
for new membership, specifically calling attention to nations that "con-
tribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily, and diplomati-
cally."1 39  And it encouraged inclusion of viewpoints "more
representative of the broader membership, especially of the developing
world."140 Finally, the Panel implored the Assembly not to hinder the
effectiveness of the Council, but to render it more accountable under
democratic principles.141 Language reflecting these considerations is pre-
sent in each of the leading proposals.
D. EVENTUAL REFORM
The basic concerns espoused in the Panel's report clearly underlie the
various approaches, namely widespread representation on an effective
and decisive Council, comprised of powerful nations that contribute to
the greater good through funding the U.N. and providing actual resources
for the missions upon which the organization embarks. Security Council
reform is not without critics: there exists opposition to significant reform,
including against any expansion of the Council.142 But the overarching
theme seems to be that reform-including expansion-is inevitable.
Whether the larger Council will have additional permanent members is
certainly an open question. And whether the veto power would be ex-
tended is even more difficult to say. Nonetheless, assuming that the
eventual expansion does include additional permanent members, at least
one-and probably only one-will be reserved for a nation in the Ameri-
cas. The clear choice for that permanent seat on the Security Council is







142. E.g., Nile Gardiner & Brett D. Schaefer, U.N. Security Council Expansion is Not in
the U.S. Interest, BACKGROUNDER, Aug. 18, 2005 at 1.
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IV. SOUTH AMERICAN ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER
A. ECONOMIC STRENGTH
Brazil is the best choice for a second permanent Security Council seat
from the Americas partly because it is perfectly poised as strong region-
ally, competitive globally, and yet retains the aura of "developing nation"
or "emerging economy." This combination permits the country to be a
useful contributor with the current powers and maintain credibility
among the many nations that perceive themselves as excluded.
Brazil commands the eighth largest economy on the globe, and is a
significant contributor to the U.N. Budget for 2010 and 2011.143 Notably,
over the next budget cycle, the South American power is already ex-
pected to contribute more than one permanent member: Russia.144 Its
economic strength comes from hard lessons and aggressive management
by Brazilian leaders over the last 100 years, representing precisely the
type of financially sound nation the U.N. should want as a new perma-
nent Council member.
The country has been open for international business realistically since
1991, growing more attractive each year until 1995 when the international
markets pressured Brazil to retreat a bit toward its protectionist his-
tory.145 That same turmoil led to the creation of the Group of Twenty
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors ("G20") in 1999, of which
Brazil is a founding member.146 Now in the twenty-first century, Brazil is
one of the most trade-friendly international economies in South America,
doubling its exports from 2000 levels to $118 billion USD in 2005.147 It is
a rare example of success in the economically challenged Naught Decade.
With consistent growth trends in the 2000s, Brazil, along with the other
BRIC nations (i.e., Russia, India, and China), is setting the economic
management bar.148
As Chair of the G20 when the financial crisis erupted in the United
States, Brazil led by example, limiting its own economy's retraction to
143. See Gross Domestic Product 2008, WORI.o BANK, Oct. 7, 2009, http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICSIResources/GDP.pdf.
144. G.A. Res. 64/248, supra note 23, 1 6.
145. See Mauricio Mesquita Moreira, Brazil's Trade Policy: Old and New Issues, in
BRAZIL AS AN ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER? UNDERSTANDING BRAZIL'S CHANGING
ROLE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 137, 137-39 (Lael Brainard & Leonardo Marti-
nez-Diaz eds., 2009).
146. What is the G-20, G-20, http://www.g20.orglabout-whatisg20.aspx (last visited
Sept. 16, 2010).
147. Pedro Da Motta Veiga, Brazil's Trade Policy: Moving Away from Old Paradigms?,
in BRAZIL AS AN ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER? UNDERSTANDING BRAZIL'S CIIANG-
ING ROLE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 113, 125 (Lael Brainard & Leonardo Marti-
nez-Diaz eds., 2009).
148. See Tyler Cowen, Fruitful Decade for Many in the World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3,2010,
at BU4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/03/business/economy/03view.
html.
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only two quarters and emerging early from recession.149 In fact, in the
midst of the financial turmoil up north, but before the crisis reached its
critical stage, Brazil's national debt received investment grade status from
Standard & Poor's.150 Riding that wave of success while Brazil was host-
ing the 2008 G20 Summit in Sio Paulo, Brazilian President Luiz Indcio
Lula da Silva ("Lula") heavily criticized the United States and other
prominent economic leaders for failing to mitigate the damage, and de-
manded a role in resolving the crisis.' 5 The host nation had credibility
and an attentive global audience: as an "emerging economy," Brazil can
be a shining part of the "us" in the developing world to the United States
and European Union's "them." And this is a key representational ele-
ment when considering a new permanent member on the Security
Council.
On the other hand, Professor Michael Reisman contends that Brazil
(and India for that matter) is too powerful and would neither represent
nor increase the legitimacy of the Security Council in the developing
world because it "could hardly reflect [a Third World] perspective in an
authentic manner."152 True, half of the BRIC countries are already per-
manent members on the Council, and yet there are continual calls for
developing-world representation. The challenge with adding an 'authen-
tic' representative nation is the near impossibility that it would satisfy the
demanding criteria expected for any new permanent member. The High-
level Panel's requirements referencing contributions to U.N. financing
and human resources-which seem to be minimum qualifications-are
not likely to allow many developing nations to join the Council in a per-
manent capacity.
But Brazil provides a middle ground of sorts. First, as an emerging
economy, the international community recognizes its contributions in the
global marketplace. Much of the economic success Brazil enjoys today
grew from the foundation laid by Minister of Economy (1993-94) and,
later, President Fernando Cardoso (1995-2002) with his Plano Real.153
Since taking office in 2003, Lula has also been a driving force.154 The new
President Lula continued some core fiscal policies of Cardoso's Adminis-
tration, and went even further in other areas, including his efforts in lead-
149. Lessons from Brazil: Why is it Bouncing Back While Other Markets Stumble?,
UNIvERsIA KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Mar. 1, 2010, http://www.wharton.universia.
net/index.cfm?fa=ViewArticle&id=1 807&language=english.
150. See Fabio Alves & Carlos Caminada, Brazil Debt Raised to Investment Grade by
S&P, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 30, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=A86v4f6 W2Jg.
151. Alexei Barrionuevo, Demand for a Say on a Way Out of the Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2008, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/business/
worldbusiness/l0g2O.html.
152. Reisman, supra note 62, at 13.
153. See Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Lula's Foreign Policy: Regional and Global Strate-
gies, in BRAZIL UNDER LULA: ECONOMY, POLITIcS, AND SOCIETY UNDER THE
WORKER-PRESIDENT 167, 168 (Joseph L. Love & Werner Baer eds., 2009).
154. See generally The Most Popular Politician on Earth, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 22, 2009,
http://www.newsweek.com/2009/09/21/the-most-popular-politician-on-earth.html.
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ing regional economic integration.155 Lula was the first Brazilian
president to realize regional integration success, particularly with the
Common Market of the South ("Mercosur" or "Mercosul"), a trade
agreement between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and associate
members Chile and Bolivia.156 Mercosur was just short of a continuous
disaster until 2004 when Brazil and Argentina began cooperating under
the agreement, thirteen years after its creation and nine years in opera-
tion.157 Now, however, it is the fourth largest trade bloc in the world.' 58
Second, Brazil has not forgotten the challenges a developing nation
faces. Indeed, the country still struggles with providing adequate infra-
structure in some regions.' 59 Nor does it appear to want to be the only
prominent emerging power in the business of making important interna-
tional decisions. India, the other BRIC nation that is not on the Security
Council, is a key partner in the G-4 push for Council seats.160 Both Brazil
and India embody a degree of credibility among the underrepresented
developing world that neither China nor Russia is perceived to have.
And, illustratively, Brazil is using this international political capital on
more projects than just seeking permanent Council membership. During
the 2009 G8 Summit in L'Aquila, Italy, President Lula called for its disso-
lution arguing that "[t]he G8 no longer has a reason to exist," and de-
manded a more inclusive group to address the planet's problems.161
Whether Brazil will continue to be a voice of the developing world is a
question of international politics and perception. Indeed, if Brazil's Se-
curity Council desires are realized, it could be the impetus that pushes the
country to full peer status with the developed world. But Brazil's ten-
dency to lead by example indicates that the Brazilian government is not
one to join the other team, and leave its persona or developing allies be-
hind. The nation is uniquely situated to maintain credibility with the
many developing countries, whose support it needs to surpass the two-
thirds requirement in the General Assembly, and work peer-to-peer with
developed nations.
The recent economic struggles of the United States and other dominant
economies provided Brazil with a prime opportunity to demonstrate that
developing nations and emerging economies are important in our mod-
ern, globalized economy, especially in times of crisis. Brazil navigated
155. Id.
156. AILFRED P. MONTERO, BRAZILIAN PouIcs REFORMING A DEMOCRATIC STAT-
IN A CHANGING Woizu 124 (2005).
157. See id.
158. Joanna Klonsky & Stephanie Hanson, Mercosur: South America's Fractious Trade
Bloc, BACKGROUNDER, Aug. 20, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12762/.
159. See, e.g., Brazil: Shaky Infrastructure, LATIN BUSINESS CHRONIcu, Aug. 2, 2010,
http://www.1atinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=4407.
160. Asif Ezdi, Reforming the UN Security Council, AL ARABIYA NEWS CHANNEL,
June 14, 2010, http://www.alarabiya.net/views/2010/06/14/111347.html.
161. Jamie Smyth, Are the Rich States Being Dwarfed by World's Emerging Economic
Giants?, IRIS] i TIMEs, July 11, 2009, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/
2009/0711/1224250465067.html.
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the economic storm better than most and is now poised as a dominant
force in its own right. The source of this economic strength comes prima-
rily from two sources: energy and agriculture.
B. ENERGY
1. Ethanol
As a world leader in renewable energy production and use, Brazil sets
a strong example in the Western Hemisphere. Following the petroleum
market crises and volatility in the 1970s and 80s, Brazil established alter-
native energy policies to reduce its dependence on foreign oil.162 Stem-
ming from these domestic clean-energy policies, nearly fifty percent of
Brazil's energy consumption in recent years is from renewable sources.' 63
The most notable source is ethanol derived from sugar, which is plentiful
because sugarcane has been a staple of the nation's crops since
colonization.16 4
Today, Brazil is the global leader in ethanol production.' 65 Domestic
use of ethanol increased thirty-four percent from 2006 to 2007 while the
use of gasoline decreased nearly four percent during that same period.166
In fact, while Brazil's total energy use from 1977 to 2007 increased 234%,
dependence on petroleum products for energy has dropped from over
half of all energy use in 1977 to barely forty percent in 2007.167 In large
part, the country's bountiful sugarcane industry is driving down depen-
dence on oil and increasing use of ethanol, and this rising ethanol use is
not limited to Brazil's borders.168 With vast fertile agricultural regions in
a primarily tropical climate, Brazil is the world's number one exporter of
sugarcane and ethanol, spreading renewable energy sources across the
world.169
2. Oil
Petrobrls, Brazil's state-controlled oil company, is a leading source of
162. FRANCISCO VIDAL LUNA & HIRanIRr S. KLEIN, BRAZIL SINCE 1980 156 (2006).
163. Ricardo Ubiraci Sennes & Thais Narciso, Brazil as an International Energy Player,
in BRAZIL AS AN ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER? UNDERSTANDING BRAZIL'S CIIANG-
ING ROLE IN THE GLOl3AL ECONOMY 17, 30 (Lael Brainard & Leonardo Martinez-
Diaz eds., 2009).
164. LUNA & KLEIN, supra note 162, at 101.
165. Andr6 Meloni Nassar, Brazil as an Agricultural and Agroenergy Superpower, in
BRAZIL AS AN ECONOMIC SUPERPOWER? UNDERSTANDING BRAZIL'S CHANGING
ROLE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 55, 65 (Lael Brainard & Leonardo Martinez-
Diaz eds., 2009).
166. Minesterio de Minas e Energia, Balanco Energetico Nacional [National Energy
Balance Sheet] 17 (2007), http://www.worldenergy.org/documents/resultados-pre
ben_2008.pdf.
167. Id. at 34-37.
168. Nassar, supra note 165, at 65.
169. Id.
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national pride and wealth.170 The company produced an average of over
2.5 million barrels of oil per day in 2009 and exported nearly a quarter of
what it produced, netting a trade surplus of $2.87 billion U.S. dollars.' 7 '
Rendering Brazil essentially independent in terms of petroleum, Pe-
trobris is overwhelmingly successful. 172
In April 2008, the oil giant rocked the international community when it
announced a new oilfield in the ultra deep waters off Brazil's coast.' 73
Reported to be the third-largest reserve in the world, Petrobris domina-
tion of pre-salt oil drilling technology has helped to set Brazil up to be a
major international energy provider. 174 Additional discoveries followed
in 2009 with an estimated fifty billion barrels worth of untapped oil rest-
ing just off Brazil's coast.'75 To celebrate the discoveries, President Lula
called for legislation that would instantly render the extracted oil a state
asset and direct half of all oil recovered from the offshore fields-by any-
one-to Brazil's reserves.' 76
Brazil's popularity as the newest oil powerhouse is sweeping the planet,
providing the nation with benefits beyond mere economic prowess. Bra-
zil has the ears of world leaders that do not often listen to each other, a
situational strength demonstrating Brazil's potential as an exceptionally
valuable permanent member on the U.N. Security Council. For example,
both the United States and Israel have reached out to Brazil regarding
Iran's nuclear ambitions. 77 For its part, Brazil has defended Iran's devel-
opment of nuclear technology for non-militaristic purposes while pointing
to its own use of nuclear energy. 78 That is not to say that Brazil is in
170. Inae Riveras, Petrobras 2009 Oil, Derivatives Exports Up 4.8 Percent, RE-urI-I;s,
Jan. 29, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2998061201001 29?type= Mar-
ketsNews.
171. Oil and Gas Production in 2009, PEIROBRAS, Jan. 19, 2010, http://www2.petrobras.
com.br/ri/spic/bco-arq/Produgho-dez-eng.pdf; see also Riveras, supra note 170.
172. See Fact Sheet 2009, Petrobras, http://www2.petrobras.com.br/ri/ing/pdflfactsheet
ING.pdf.
173. Notification of New Discover in the Santos Basin Pre-salt Layer, PETROBRAs, Apr.
14, 2009, http://www2.petrobras.com.br/ri/spic/bco-arq/DescobertalgaquIng.pdf;
see Rodrigo Gaier, Update 4: New Joint Oil Find May Be Biggest Yet in Brazil,
REUTERS, Apr. 14, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1436789420080414.
174. See Alan Clendenning, Brazil Oil Field Could be Huge Find, HuFFINGTON PosT,
Apr. 14, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/04/15/brazil-oil-field-could-be_
n 96693.html.
175. Brazil's Oil Policy: Preparing to Spend a "Millionaire Ticket" from Offshore, TIE
ECONOMIST, Sept. 5, 2009, http://www.epe.gov.br/imprensa/Clipping/20090903_a.
pdf.
176. Id.; but see Raymond Colitt, Lula Asked to Take Brazil Oil Bill Off Fast Track,
RE UTERS, Sept. 2,2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN02817720090902 (ex-
plaining Brazilian Congress resisting Lula's push for nationalizing the oil fields).
177. Alexei Barrionuevo, Obama Writes to Brazil's Leader About Iran, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/25/world/americas/25brazil.html;
Marco Sibaja, Israel: Brazil Can Help Stop Iran's Nuclear Program, HUFFINGTON
Pos-r, July 22, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/22/israel-brazil-can-
help-st-n_243088.htmi.
178. Brazil Says Threatening Iran Inappropriate, ISLAMI DAVEr, Dec. 4, 2009, http://
www.islamidavet.com/english/2009/12/04/brazil-says-threatening-iran-inappropri-
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league with Iran, as is the perception of Venezuelan President Hugo Ch6-
vez, the United States' most notorious South American antagonist.' 79
Brazil, it seems, is able to maintain public diplomatic relations with Iran
without aligning with Tehran to the extent of alienating the United States
and other key nations.
It is undeniable that Iran is establishing closer ties with Latin and
South America.180 A clear sign of Iran's presence in the region is the
eleven new Iranian embassies opened since 2005, including one in Bra-
zil.' 8 1 Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Brazil during a
trip around South America in November 2009, prompting international
scrutiny over his intentions in the United States' "backyard."1 8 2 While
Venezuela may be courting Iran, Brazil has no trouble maintaining its
composure and independence. Declining an invitation from Iran to join
OPEC in August 2008, Brazil has sought to stand out on its own.' 83
By keeping these countries at arm's length, Brazil is in a unique posi-
tion of popularity without apparent enemies. This configuration would
serve the South American power well as a permanent member on the
Security Council. With a permanent seat, Brazil could be a direct route
from the Council to both Iran and Venezuela. Because Brazil is a signifi-
cant oil-exporting country, it has connections with nations that are other-
wise unavailable and has the ability to bridge sizable communication
gaps, even those beyond the current relations with ChAvez and
Ahmadinejad.
C. AGRICULTURE
Brazil ranks third in independent countries that export agricultural
goods, behind only the United States and Canada, and is the leading ex-
porter in key staples, such as chicken and beef.184 Like many of the ad-
vantages Brazil enjoys today, this status is rooted in a history of long-term
strategies employed during financial crises of the twentieth century, be-
ginning with the global financial crisis of 1929.185 Brazil's economic
179. See Chavez Rejects Clinton's Threat Over Iran Ties, ISLAMI DAVET, Dec. 14, 2009,
http://www.isIamidavet.com/english/2009/12/14/chavez-rejects-clintons-threat-over-
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183. See OPEC Invites Brazil to Join Group, BBC NEws, Sept. 4, 2008, http://news.bbc.
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OPEC, REUTERS, Sept. 6, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE58517Y
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strength is deeply entrenched in its history and has grown into a driver of
many parts of the world.186
When the nation fell victim to dramatic effects of global economic tur-
moil, a Brazilian revolutionary leader, Getillio Vargas, led a successful
takeover in the Revolution of 1930 and became the 14th President of
Brazil. 87 Under Vargas, Brazil became a bureaucratic-authoritarian cap-
italist state.' 88 Initially, the new president continued the liberal economic
policies of the prior administrations, but he also launched a strong effort
toward industrialization and away from the agrarian-based economy. 189
The heavy toll of the global economy soon began to challenge the tradi-
tional economy-management practices of many nations including Brazil,
which turned to import-substitution strategies designed to isolate the na-
tional economy from the dangers of the global economic swings.190
At the beginning of the twentieth century, coffee was the primary ex-
port and crucial source of income for the large but fragile nation, ac-
counting for nearly seventy percent of incoming foreign capital.' 9 '
International demand for Brazilian coffee plummeted in the 1930s and
the diminished income stream from international sources threatened to
cripple the Brazilian economy. 192 The Vargas Administration's initial re-
sponse was to institute protectionist programs to favor domestic goods
over imports with high tariffs on external sources and meet the people's
demand with homegrown supply.1 93 Like many other national leaders at
the time, Vargas began managing the national economy with a heavier
hand.194
Still heading toward industrialization, but reeling from the sting of the
global import/export markets, Vargas intervened in nearly every aspect of
domestic production and distribution with aims to grow more self-suffi-
cient and less susceptible to the whims of international consumers.195 Be-
ginning with the nation's prized cash crop, in 1932, he created the
National Coffee Council that regulated coffee production, distribution,
farmer subsidies, permissible quantities of plants, and even surplus de-
struction.196 Throughout the decade, additional product-specific public
institutions followed, leading to a highly-regulated agricultural sector de-
186. See generally id.
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signed to reduce-and when practical, eliminate-reliance on imports.197
Agricultural exporting remained a foreign money stream, especially
coffee, rubber, and sugar.198 But it was not until the industrialization ef-
forts began to take hold that the government made significant investment
in agrarian areas.199 In 1953, it developed the Superintendency for the
Amazonia Economic Valorization Plan, a strategy to increase Amazonian
agricultural production considerably to support the growing industrial
centers in urban areas. 200
Now Brazil is a well insulated and reliable economic environment. Af-
ter years of import-substitution practices, and as a current leader in agri-
cultural exports, Brazil has the requisite independence a permanent
Security Council member needs. Like an independent judiciary is critical
to effective justice, Brazil has the luxury of an objective perspective of a
stand-alone provider of essential needs, not encumbered by political re-
strictions. Such posture would not be possible without robust economic
strength and independence. As demonstrated during the first decade of
this century, its economy is clearly strong enough to rival the economies
of the most prominent global powers.
V. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP
A. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
Second only to the United States, Brazil is perhaps the most influential
nation in the Western Hemisphere with respect to international affairs
and diplomatic relations, and certainly the preeminent country of Latin
and South America. It was an original nonpermanent member of the
U.N. Security Council and has been elected to a seat more than any other
country besides Japan, with which it is tied at ten.201 This history signifi-
cantly supports Brazil as a leading contender for a permanent seat on an
expanded Security Council. 202 Moreover, Brazil has played major roles
in U.N. peacekeeping operations, a key criterion identified by the High-
level Panel for permanent membership.203
On January 12, 2010, a magnitude seven earthquake struck Port-au-
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Prince, Haiti, crippling the Caribbean island-nation.204 Ten foreign
soldiers stationed on the island as part the U.N. Stabilization Mission in
Haiti (MINUSTAH) died in the disaster. 2 0 5 These foreign troops were
Brazilian.206 Since MINUSTAH was established by the Security Council
in 2004 in response to a coup d'6tat, Brazil has lead the military arm of
the peacekeeping effort in Haiti.2 0 7 The mission has been Brazil's largest
military operation in over forty years, and the second of two significant
instances of challenging the United States in terms of international influ-
ence during the first decade of the twenty-first century. 208
The first instance came during the Honduras Constitutional Crisis in
June 2009. Brazil was the primary power to support the deposed Hondu-
ras President Manuel Zelaya, establishing a safe-haven in its embassy in
Tegucigalpa. 209 Even after significant efforts to press for negotiations
that would reinstate the ousted president failed, Brazil refused to recog-
nize the legitimacy of the new government.210 When the United States
came out willing to recognize the Honduran elections, Brazil threatened
action aimed to isolate the North American superpower from much of
Latin America, and Brazil appears to have stronger support in the Organ-
ization of American States for its efforts.2 11 Brazil has significant influ-
ence in South and Latin America, and this makes it a key ally for access
to the region.
In addition to flexing its national strength to enforce peace, Brazil has
also been a key actor in establishing international organizations to solid-
ify the South American community. In an attempt to balance the powers
of the United States to the north, and the E.U. to the east, Brazil led
twelve South American nations to form their own union: South American
Union of Nations ("UNASUR" or "UNASUL"). 212 The requisite num-
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ber of nations has not ratified the international union in their respective
national legislatures, but the national leaders have continued to work to-
ward developing the union since the Cusco Declaration in 2004, including
military and economic cooperation. 213 As a leader in the South Ameri-
can community, Brazil, in effect, would bring the entire continent to the
Security Council table. And in doing so, it would provide a certain de-
gree of balance that is absent.
B. CLIMATE CHANGE
The year of 2009 marked what many believed would be aggressive
targeting of global climate change. 214 The 2009 U.N. Climate Change
Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark was expected to be a significant
step in the battle against climate change and a substantial amount of pub-
lic interest for the conference permeated the year. 215 In June, the U.N.
partnered with I.A.A. Global to launch an unprecedented advertising
campaign for the conference. 216 For the first time, people around the
globe could receive real-time updates as the history was unfolding via
Twitter.217
Brazil set an important example of identifying and addressing nontradi-
tional threats to international peace and security, specifically with its ap-
proach to climate change. Brazilian President Lula believes "[c]limate
change is the most challenging issue we face today," and has kept the
environment in the forefront of his agenda.218 Brazil-labeled as "one of
the top world greenhouse gas ("GHG") emitters"-can attribute most of
its emissions to Amazonian deforestation, which is unique as most coun-
tries' GHG emissions stem from fossil fuel consumption. 219 This reality is
a two-fold problem for the country: deforestation of the world's most fa-
mous rainforest and air pollution. On the other hand, it can be seen as an
opportunity to kill two birds with one stone: reduce deforestation to pre-
serve the Amazon and, in so doing, lower GHG emissions. And this is
Brazil's approach.
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1. Amazonian Deforestation
In 2009, the Brazilian government set its first domestic goal to reduce
GHG emissions: a reduction of forty percent by 2020.220 Brazil expects
to meet this goal primarily through reducing Amazonian deforestation by
eighty percent over the same period.221 Last year was a significant step.
With deforestation down forty-six percent from 2008 to 2009, Brazil Envi-
ronment Minister Carlos Minc explained the nation would enjoy "the
lowest deforestation in 21 years." 2 2 2 The trend has been an annual de-
cline since deforestation rates peaked at a shocking 27,772 square kilome-
ters of lost Amazon rainforest in 2004.223 In contrast, only 7,008 square
kilometers were harvested in 2009, and the Ministry of Environment at-
tributes much of the recent success to increased surveillance and enforce-
ment of the existing deforestation laws.2 2 4
It should be noted, however, that this aggressive policy is a seeming
change that came after a long history of blaming industrialized nations for
GHG emissions and insisting it was their responsibility to correct, or at
least take the first steps. Even as recently as June 2009, President Lula
had told the "rich countries" that they had to act first.225 But it was Bra-
zil that set the example with the resounding success addressing deforesta-
tion and collateral GHG emissions over 2009. This step is essential, as
the world now sees the South American nation as a leader in the climate
change movement. In fact, without Brazil's initiative to take these un-
precedented steps, a global response to climate change would surely con-
tinue to be kicked down the road as other matters distract the so-called
"developed" countries. Brazil is demonstrating a rare phenomenon on
the climate change front: real leadership.
2. Copenhagen
Brazil is already stepping into that role of global leadership, evidenced
by its willingness to set and reach environmental goals domestically and
through its commanding displays in the international community leading
up to and at Copenhagen in December 2009.226 In establishing a strategic
partnership with the E.U. in 2007, President Lula appears to be answer-
ing the call of duty for the Western Hemisphere when other nations, most
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notably the United States, are unable or unwilling to come to the table.2 2 7
Together, the E.U. and Brazil worked diligently in the months before Co-
penhagen to design a sufficient framework, in which a robust and legally
binding multinational agreement would be able to arise at the December
Climate Change meeting and thrive thereafter as a successor to the 1997
Kyoto Protocol. 228
President Lula also teamed up with French President Nicolas Sarkozy
last fall, bringing their nations' resources together in a "diplomatic offen-
sive" to attract more multinational pragmatic support for dealing with
environmental challenges. 229 The offensive's primary targets were the
top two GHG emitters: China and the United States. 230 Both countries
have been butting heads over GHG emissions, refusing to give unilateral
concessions, and were looking for some degree of reconciliation in the
weeks approaching Copenhagen.2 3 1 In anticipation of the meeting be-
tween President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao, Lula, joined
by Sarkozy at a joint press conference, refused to take a back seat, de-
manding more than just Chinese and U.S. situations be taken into ac-
count in any resolutions. 2 3 2
At Copenhagen, the world saw the excitement and effort designed to
make historic progress climax with the lackluster, non-binding "Copenha-
gen Accord." 2 3 3 The Accord, written by Brazil with South Africa, China,
India, and the United States, has a clear Brazilian influence. Paragraph 3,
for example, specifically requires financial and technological assistance
for developing countries, an issue Lula has raised repeatedly. 234 Granted,
the Accord was merely "noted" officially at the conclusion of Copenha-
gen, has been heavily criticized, dismissed as "meaningless spin" by some,
and left unsigned by many nations.235
On the other hand, it signifies some accomplishment. The United
States, for example, pledged to reduce GHG emissions attributable to the
U.S. government by twenty-eight percent by 2020.236 At least one author
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sees the promises as progress in key areas: (1) it proposes "real cuts" in
GHG from the world's worst offenders, (2) it provides for a "transparent
framework for evaluating countries' performance," and (3) it provides re-
sources to developing nations. 237 This third category supports Brazil's
maintaining allegiance to representing developing nations' interests, an
important piece of Brazil's foreign policy r6sum6 during its efforts for
permanent membership on the Security Council.
VI. CONCLUSION
Brazil is a key supporter of the United Nations, both in financing and
in providing boots on the ground. Its national strength is rooted in a well-
developed economy, based on a combination of bountiful natural re-
sources, significant population size, and well-regulated domestic and for-
eign capital markets. It is a clear rival to world powers in terms of
influence in South America, and may hold keys to other areas, notably
the oil-rich and traditionally unstable Middle East. These factors heavily
favor Brazil as the next permanent member of the Security Council, as-
suming that when the Council expands it includes new permanent seats.
The South American behemoth is already more dominant regionally
than the United States in many respects. As Brazil becomes more influ-
ential in world politics-especially if it can continue to lead in two of the
most important areas facing international leaders: energy and climate
change-it becomes ever more evident how important Brazil is to inter-
national policy making bodies and actors, such as the Security Council.
Further, Brazil has developed diplomatic relationships that may permit it
to be a significant contributor in resolving serious issues in the Middle
East, much of which is attributable to its role in the international petro-
leum markets.
Brazil's leadership on the climate change front, most notably marked
by its participation at Copenhagen and its role in the resulting Accord,
would add additional credibility to the Council as that issue grows in im-
portance. Climate change may become more devastating to international
security than any human threat of violence. Brazil's fight provides the
experience necessary to win the climate change battle.
Finally, Brazil would bring over 200 million people to the table, repre-
senting just one more significant reason-in addition to a long list of eco-
nomic, political, and environmental reasons-to bring Brazil onto the
Security Council as a permanent member.
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